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I. Introduction 
In 1996, a Democratic president, Bill Clinton, famously declared: "The 
era of big [g]overnment is over."1 The question for U.S. policymakers and 
legal scholars ever since has been: what is taking-indeed, what should 
take-the place of the "command-and-control" post-New Deal regulatory 
state? 
Legal scholarship and pedagogy on the regulatory state are at parallel, 
important junctures, and two new books stand at the cutting edge. The first, 
Law and New Governance in the EU and the US,2 edited by Gniinne de 
Bfuca and Joanne Scott, is a collection of works by some of the leading 
scholars in the "new governance" field. New governance scholars have both 
described and laid the theoretical foundation for what they see as promising 
and innovative efforts to address public problems. 3 These efforts attempt to 
be less hierarchical, more transparent, and more democratic than traditional 
top-down forms of regulation. 
The second, The Regulatory and Administrative State: Materials, Cases, 
Comments,4 by Lisa Heinzerling and Mark Tushnet, is one of the first case-
books for a class on the regulatory state and may have helped persuade 
Harvard's faculty that adding such a class to the first-year curriculum was 
feasible as part of their recent curricular reform. 5 Moreover, as the first in 
Oxford University Press's Twenty-First Century Legal Education series,6 an 
unusual foray by the elite academic publisher into books for American legal 
education, the book will no doubt be influential at many elite law schools. 
Besides Harvard, Stanford is also undertaking significant curricular reform, 
I. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, I PUB. PAPERS 79, 
79 (Jan. 23, 1996). 
2. LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US (Gniinne de Blirca & Joanne Scott 
eds., 2006) [hereinafter LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE]. 
3. See, e.g., Peter Cane, Review of Executive Action, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL 
STUDIES 146 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003) (discussing administrative law); Christine 
Parker & John Braithwaite, Regulation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES, supra, at 
119 (discussing regulation for the purpose of furthering "democratic experimentalism"); Michael 
Taggart, The Nature and Functions of the State, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES, 
supra, at 101 (discussing privatization). 
4. LISA HEINZERLING & MARK V. TuSHNET, THE REGULATORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: 
MATERIALS, CASES, COMMENTS (2006). 
5. See HLS: News: HLS Faculty Unanimously Approves First-Year Curricular Reform, 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2006/J0/06_curriculum.php (last updated Oct. 15, 2006) 
[hereinafter HLS Curricular Reform} (discussing Harvard Law School's curricular reform, 
including the addition of a first-year course on legislation and regulation). Tushnet teaches at 
Harvard, where one of Clinton's chief domestic-policy aides from the second term, Elena Kagan, is 
the dean. See HLS Office of the Dean: Dean Kagan Biography, http://www.law.harvard.edu/dean/ 
bio.php (last updated July 19, 2006). 
6. The series is edited by Larry Kramer, the dean of Stanford Law School, which is currently in 
the middle of curricular reform, see Tresa Baldas, Several Schools Adjust Their Curriculums, NAT'L 
L.J., Sept. 10, 2007, at Sl, Sl; Martha Minow, who spearheaded Harvard's effort, see HLS 
Curricular Reform, supra note 5 (noting that Minow chaired Harvard's curricular-reform process); 
and Tushnet himself. Tushnet also has a chapter in Law and New Governance. 
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though focusing more on the second and third years/ and Dean Edward 
Rubin of Vanderbilt is leading an ambitious effort at that school.8 
ln this Review, I aim to link these two books and the developments in 
the legal academy for which they stand: the scholarly effort to rethink the 
role of the state in the twenty-first century and the curricular effort to make 
courses on the regulatory state a core part of legal education. I think both 
books are tremendously important and largely succeed on their own terms. 
But I argue in this Review that they share a common flaw: a lack of attention 
to the "adversarial legalism" that pervades American policymaking and 
implementation. 9 
Part II of this Review describes the emerging new governance literature, 
as captured in Law and New Governance, and suggests future directions for 
new governance scholarship. Part III looks at and assesses the pedagogical 
approach taken in The Regulatory and Administrative State, locating it in the 
context of recent curricular reforms. 
Part IV critiques both books on a common ground-a lack of attention 
to adversarial legalism and the role of lawyers-and argues that this inade-
quacy threatens both the explanatory power of new governance as an 
overarching regulatory theory and the pedagogical potential of promising 
curricular reforms. I argue that a more nuanced account of how new 
governance schemes both arise and play out "on the ground" in the culture of 
adversarial legalism will help strengthen the theory's explanatory power. 
Part V concludes by arguing that both the scholarly and pedagogical devel-
opments described here could benefit from greater attention to the other. 
II. Law and New Governance 
Under a traditional, command-and-control regulatory model-embodied 
in the post-New Deal administrative state in the United States and the har-
monization efforts of the European Union-the state sets rules or standards 
7. See Baldas, supra note 6, at SJ (quoting statements by Dean Larry Kramer that the focus of 
curricular reform at Stanford Law School is on the second and third years). 
8. See Grace Renshaw, A Memorable Year, VAND. LAW., Summer 2006, at 8, II, available at 
http://grenshaw.ventress.com/Jawyer/memorable_year.html {discussing broad plans for curricular 
reform at Vanderbilt Law School). Rubin is himself a leading scholar in regulatory theory, see, e.g., 
EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE 
(2005), and is also chairing the Association of American Law Schools' (AALS) committee on 
curriculum development. E-mail from Gloria L. Groover, Human Resources Manager, Association 
of American Law Schools, to Rebecca Kalmus, Member, Texas Law Review (Nov. 20, 2007) (on 
file with the Texas Law Review). Vanderbilt recently adopted a required four-credit Regulatory 
State course in the first year as part of this curriculum-reform effort. See VANDERBILT LAw 
SCHOOL'S CURRICULAR REFORM INITIATIVE, available at http://www.aals.org/documents/ 
curriculum/documentsNanderbiltCurricularReform.pdf. 
9. I borrow this phrase from ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN 
WAY OF LAw {200 I), where he describes adversariallegalism as a "method of policymaking and 
dispute resolution" characterized by formal legal contestation and litigant activism. !d. at 9. Kagan 
sees adversarial legalism as "a mode of governance, embedded in the political culture and political 
structure of the United States." !d. at 5. 
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through the legislature or agencies delegated power by the legislature, and 
private actors must comply with those rules. The state enforces those rules 
through inspection and other means, sometimes with the help of private at-
torneys general. 
But the command-and-control model has come under attack in the last 
few decades on a number of fronts. Primary among them is the inefficiency 
and stickiness of the rulemaking process. 10 In a world of uncertainty, 
legislatures and agencies are unable to predict what the best rules will be 
down the road, and the mechanisms for monitoring and adjusting the rules in 
light of experience are severely lacking. 11 As Michael Dorf, one of the lead-
ing new governance scholars, puts it, "[I]n the conditions of modern life, 
people increasingly find that their problem is not so much an inability to per-
suade those with different interests or viewpoints of what to do; their 
problem is that no one has a complete solution to what collectively ails 
them." 12 There is also considerable evidence that compliance levels are 
disappointingly low. 13 Finally, scarce state resources mean that agencies are 
unable to sufficiently help private actors comply, to enforce the law, or to 
monitor and update rules in light of experience. 
New governance, then, arises out of this critique of the command-and-
control model. Under the rubric of democratic experimentalism, scholars 
drawing on a pragmatist tradition have presented compelling case studies of 
new modes of regulation that incorporate robust public participation, 
benchmarking, and information sharing to solve public problems.14 
Administrative law scholars are observing that the traditional model of the 
administrative state-where regulatory agencies with expertise issue rules 
that regulated entities must follow-is giving way to a mode of 
"collaborative governance," where agencies and industry representatives 
work together to define and revise standards. 15 Together, these scholarly 
10. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA 
L. REv. I, 3 (1997) ("Regulation is currently under attack from all quarters as inefficient, 
ineffective, and undemocratic."). 
II. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 
COLUM. L. REv. 267, 278, 278-79 (1998) (stating that "the increasing volatility and complexity of 
social and economic circumstances" has made it more difficult for agencies and Congress to 
establish uniform rules). 
12. Michael C. Dorf,After Bureaucracy, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 1245, 1269 (2004). 
13. See Freeman, supra note 10, at 3 ("[T]hat implementation [of regulation} is inconsistent[} 
and that enforcement is at best sporadic are by now uncontroversial claims."); id. at 14-17 
(continuing the discussion of enforcement problems). 
14. SeeDorf & Sabel, supra note II, at 323-36 (detailing new methods of regulating, such as 
family support services in several states, community policing in Chicago, and military procurement 
in the U.S. Navy). 
15. See Freeman, supra note 10, at 33, 33-34 (noting that a process where regulated entities 
negotiate the substance of a rule with the regulating agency is "increasingly common in both 
environmental and health and safety regulation"). 
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strands make up the field of new governance, a series of efforts to reconceive 
the relationship between the state and those it governs. 16 
Like many new paradigms, new governance defines itself in large part 
oppositionally. The kinds of regulation encompassed in the term new 
governance tend to be less prescriptive, less top-down, and more focused on 
learning through monitoring than compliance with fixed rules. As one 
scholar put it, new governance mechanisms share emphasis on regulation 
through "centrally coordinated local problem solving." 17 Both in defining 
the problem to be addressed and devising solutions, new governance forms 
emphasize provisionality and revisability in light of experience. 18 The public 
agency acts to help local actors learn from one another about best practices 
and ensures transparency and public participation in problem solving. In 
such regimes, public and private actors interact in increasingly complex and 
collaborative ways to address problems of public policy. 
Law and New Governance is an important collection of essays on new 
approaches to governance in the United States and the European Union. The 
result of a conference at Cambridge University, the essays in this collection 
pursue three parallel lines of inquiry. First, the essays are "practical and 
empirical"-that is, they provide case studies that describe and evaluate 
ongoing experiments in new governance in the United States and the 
European Union! 9 Second, the essays explore the relationship between law 
and new governance, with some exploring the "gap" between the two 
domains, others positing that new governance is "transformative" of law, and 
others pointing to a "hybrid" approach that might prove enduring. Third, the 
essays look at the relationship between new governance and 
constitutionalism. In the European Union context, the authors are largely 
asking whether new governance mechanisms can help provide a raison 
d'etre for the European Union, while in the United States, the new 
governance scholars largely pose the model as a possible answer to the 
question of what the role of the state is now that the "era of big [g]overnment 
is over." I discuss each of these lines of inquiry below. 
A. A Mosaic of Experimentation 
The regulatory experiments examined in these case studies differ in 
their origins. Most of the U.S. examples are what we might call 
bootstrapping, bottom-up examples of reform, originating either within 
16. For an interesting theoretical account of the emergence of new governance, see Orly Lobel, 
The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal 
Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004). 
17. Susan Sturm, Gender Equity Regimes and the Architecture of Learning, in LAW AND NEW 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 323, 323. 
18. Grainne de Bfuca & Joanne Scott, Introduction: New Governance, Law and 
Constitutionalism, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at I, 3. 
19. !d. at I. 
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administrative agencies or from particular institutional actors. In the 
European Union, however, new governance efforts have been more 
deliberate and top-down as the EU Commission has funded and otherwise 
promoted research on such efforts.20 The principal new governance method 
in the European Union, known as the Open Method of Coordination, 
involves "the setting of guidelines or objectives at EU level with the 
elaboration of Member State action plans or strategy reports in an iterative 
process intended to bring about greater coordination and mutual learning in 
these policy fields."21 Drawing on the international-relations literature, some 
authors discuss this as a form of"soft law.',n 
The EU experience with new governance started with employment 
policy, which Claire Kilpatrick looks at in her essay. She sees EU 
employment governance as widespread, but only because of its "limited 
newness.''
23 That is, she looks beyond the key new governance innovation in 
this area-the Open Method of Coordination-and examines its linkages to 
other key aspects of EU employment governance, like legislation, spending 
on employment initiatives, and the establishment of fundamental rights.24 De 
Billca's own contribution takes the example of an area governed clearly by a 
human rights model-ED race-discrimination law-and shows how the EU 
Council and Parliament in 2000 adopted a directive to "implement[] the prin-
ciple of equal treatment"25 and left it to states to do so in a new governance 
fashion: through "monitoring of workplace practices, collective agreements, 
codes of conduct, research or exchange of experiences and good practices. "26 
For de Bfuca, this shows the promise of a hybrid model.27 
Health care is addressed from both the EU and U.S. perspectives. 
Tamera Hervey traces new governance methods that arose from private 
litigation in the European Union, explaining how a classic "hard-law" 
process led to soft-law new governance. In responding to the litigation, EU 
actors developed mechanisms for funding data collection, investments in 
technology, and exchanges of best practices on providing health-care 
20. !d. at2. 
21. Grainne de Bfuca, The Constitutional Challenge of New Governance in the European 
Union, 28 EUR. L. REV. 814, 824, 823-24 (2003). 
22. See, e.g., David M. Trubek, Patrick Cottrell & Mark Nance, "Soft Law," "Hard Law" and 
EU Integration, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 65, 65 (noting that the 
nonbinding governance relations of new governance are often referred to as soft law). 
23. Claire Kilpatrick, New EU Employment Governance and Constitutionalism, in LAW AND 
NEW GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 121, 121. 
24. See id. at 144-45 (discussing other key aspects ofEU employment governance). 
25. Grainne de Bfuca, EU Race Discrimination Law: A Hybrid Model?, in LAW AND NEW 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 97, 99 (quoting Council Directive 2000/43, tit., 2000 O.J. (L 180) 
22, 22 (EC)). 
26. !d. at 101 (quoting Council Directive 2000/43, supra note 25, art. 11, at 25). 
27. See id. at 119, 118-20 (observing that the European Union's race-discrimination regime has 
evolved to combine a traditional "legal rights-based instrument at its core" with a framework that 
embodies aspects of a new governance approach). 
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services.28 The new governance practices emerging in the United States 
around health care, according to Louise Trubek's account, focus on some of 
the same issues, with the traditional rules in the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of I99629 leading to the creation of a series 
of public and private collaboratives for implementing technology in health 
care while protecting data privacy.30 
Environmental regulation, too, has new governance aspects on both 
sides of the Atlantic. In the European Union, environmental assessment has 
a long history and, recently, a distinct experimentalist bent, according to the 
account by Joanne Scott and Jane Holder. The practice of reason giving and 
information pooling can lead to a "feedback loop" that, combined with robust 
public participation, can produce better outcomes. 31 Similarly, an EU direc-
tive for protecting water quality has a distinct new governance feel, with 
sharing of best practices and benchmarking across member states.32 Bradley 
Karkkainnen's account looks optimistically at two kinds of legal rules in the 
United States: regulatory-penalty defaults that allow parties to contract 
around the hard-law requirements and destabilization rights arising from citi-
zen suits that can induce public agencies to adopt collaborative new 
governance approaches. 33 
Occupational health and safety in the United States, the locus for some 
of the harshest critiques of command-and-control regulation, is the subject of 
Orly Lobel's account of experimentation. In recent years, the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has developed a variety of 
"cooperative programmes" that exempt firms with exemplary safety records 
from inspections, provide training to firms in targeted industries, and foster 
sharing of best practices among firms, trade associations, and unions.34 
Though there is some evidence that these programs have had success in re-
ducing accident rates, one of the most promising of such programs-a 
Clinton-era effort to target dangerous workplaces-was struck down after the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce successfully challenged it as subject to formal-
28. Tamara K. Hervey, The European Union and the Governance of Health Care, in LAW AND 
NEW GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 179, 188-91. 
29. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 
1996. 
30. Louise G. Trubek, New Governance Practices in US Health Care, in LAW AND NEW 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 245, 253-54. 
31. See Joanne Scott & Jane Holder, Law and New Environmental Governance in the European 
Union, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 211, 223, 223-24 ("[T]he emergence of 
European-level sustainability (or impact) assessment offers an example of a feedback loop in law 
and policy making."). 
32. !d. at 227. 
33. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Regulation and Environmental Governance, 
in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 293, 295-96. 
34. Orly Lobel, Governing Occupational Safety in the United States, in LAW AND NEW 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 269, 278-80. 
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rulemaking requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).35 
Lobel's account, then, combines optimism with disappointment. She con-
cludes that a "myriad of legal barriers" must be removed for these new 
governance efforts to be successful. 36 
Susan Sturm's essay on efforts to help women advance in science and 
engineering careers in higher education is perhaps the most cautious and do-
main specific of these case studies and, in part as a result, among the most 
compelling. Sturm demonstrates how the National Science Foundation acted 
as a "problem-solving intermediary" to work with university faculty, 
department chairs, lawyers, and other stakeholders to break down gender bias 
at the University of Michigan. 37 She illustrates the mechanisms that enabled 
people to genuinely collaborate and solve problems, and begins to explore 
the preconditions for success in other domains. 38 
Looking across these case studies, new governance seems less a 
structural or institutional description and more a description of a particular 
episternic approach toward the task of governance. lt draws on John 
Dewey's pragmatist notion of learning by doing,39 and with its emphasis on 
benchmarking and rolling best practices, draws from the "lean production" 
model ofbusiness organization.40 
The case studies are offered in both a descriptive and normative spirit. 
New forms of governance are emerging, according to these authors, and for 
improved public-policy outcomes, the more new governance, the better. 
Together, the essays form a mosaic that is largely, if not unequivocally, 
bright. 
B. Are Law and New Governance Compatible? 
lf, however, new governance regimes are not a set of rules passed by 
democratic institutions that must be followed by others, are they really law? 
As Charles Sabel and William Simon, two of the leading new governance 
theorists, articulate the concern, doubts emerge as to whether new 
governance forms can still be "law in the sense of holding officials 
accountable for their acts and assuring that citizens are otherwise secure in 
35. !d. at 279. 
36. !d. at 287, 287-88. 
37. Sturm, supra note 17, at326, 337-59. 
38. /d. at 323-25. 
39. See William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and Rolling Rule Regimes, in 
LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 37, 37 & n.2 (referring to John Dewey's conception 
of democratic government as support for using the term pragmatist to describe mainstream 
jurisprudence). 
40. See id. at 37-38 (arguing that the lean production model contradicts basic premises of 
mainstream legal theory). 
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the enjoyment of their rights."41 Most of these authors take on this question 
in one form or another and arrive at different answers. 
For a few of the authors, there is a gap between law and new 
governance that may be insurmountable. On one version of this thesis, law is 
simply blind to new governance schemes, as evidenced most distinctly by the 
failure of the EU Constitution to mention such forms of regulation.42 In 
another, more dangerous account for new governance proponents, law 
actively resists or obstructs attempts at new governance. An example is 
Lobel's account of how the courts struck down an innovative occupational-
health-and-safety program because it did not comply with formal rulemaking 
. 43 
reqmrements. 
For most of the authors, though, law and new governance can interact in 
fruitful ways. Gniinne de Burca's contribution tells a successful hybrid story 
of how judicially enforceable rights of nondiscrimination are furthered by 
spreading best practices to promote equality.44 Scott and Holder's discussion 
of the water-framework directive in the European Union is another example 
of this sort of hybrid: binding laws coupled with new governance implemen-
tation regimes.45 Louise Trubek explains how medical malpractice litigation 
in the United States can lead to new governance mechanisms that improve 
the quality of care.46 For these authors, law and new governance can peace-
ably coexist. 
For Sabel and Simon, transformation of law by new governance is 
inevitable and desirable. They remind readers of the "enduring insight of 
nineteenth-century social theory that great innovations only arise in condi-
tions that undermine their antecedents."47 New forms of governance are 
emerging because of the limits of law, and further undermining of law ought 
to be embraced. 
New governance also presents, directly and indirectly, a critique of and 
(for some) an intentional challenge to the rights-based model of legal 
liberalism. For progressives seeking to strengthen norms like 
antidiscrimination, the road to success is not by "claiming rights," as in a tra-
ditional regulatory model, but by "solving problems," as in new 
governance.48 Simon uses the heuristic device of Toyota's lean production 
41. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Epilogue: Accountability Without Sovereignty, in 
LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 395, 395. 
42. See de Btirca & Scott, supra note 18, at II ("The formal constitutional framework of the 
EU ... seems largely blind to the spreading practices of new governance."). 
43. See Lobel, supra note 34, at 279-80. 
44. See de Btirca, supra note 25, at 97. 
45. See de Burca & Scott, supra note 18, at 8. 
46. Trubek, supra note 30, at 257. 
47. Sabel & Simon, supra note 41, at 396. 
48. See William H. Simon, Solving Problems Vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge 
to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127 (2004) (criticizing traditional legal liberalism 
and favoring the problem-solving pragmatist vision). 
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model, calling new governance Toyota jurisprudence.49 Under this model, 
stakeholders (like Toyota's workers and managers) collaborate to reduce 
pollution, minimize workplace injuries, raise the academic achievement of 
the disadvantaged, and achieve other normatively attractive goals. 5° 
For defenders of conventional notions oflaw, a primary objection to this 
approach, though, is that of "legitimacy" or "accountability." Sabel and 
Simon describe the concern this way: 
The deep worry here is that the explicit provisionality of new 
governance framework laws obligates those who "follow" the legal 
rules to re-write them in the act of applying them; that this revision is 
at the discretion of those who do the revising; and that this inevitable 
exercise of discretion is incompatible with the kinds of accountability 
on which citizens of a democracy rightly insist in the elaboration of 
administrative rules and constitutional rights. 51 
But the very notion of accountability as a meaningful concept has been 
undermined, as Sabel and Simon point out. Under the traditional, 
hierarchical notion of principal-agent accountability, the principal-a 
democratically elected legislature-hands down rules, and the administrative 
agent implements those rules,52 disciplined if she goes astray by an 
independent judiciary tasked with enforcing accountability as a "matter of 
pedigree."53 If this account was ever realistic, it is no longer. The legislature 
is simply not able to lay down rules with enough specificity so as to elimi-
nate discretion. In such a regime, the new governance theorists argue, a 
more "dynamic accountability," where agents are forced to transparently jus-
tify their decisions and are evaluated by peers making similar decisions, 
better fulfills the desideratum of a government that is responsive to its 
citizens. 54 
The new governance scholars welcome the challenge that new 
governance poses to law. Many see the concept of law as no longer useful in 
analyzing the modem regulatory state, and they are not alone. As another 
prominent U.S. scholar of regulatory theory recently put it, perhaps we ought 
to "bracket the concept of law" altogether, "suspend[ing] its claim to de-
scribe some aspect of our society in a useful or convincing way" and deploy 
49. Simon, supra note 39, at 37. 
50. Simon, supra note 48, at 181-86. 
51. Sabel & Simon, supra note 41, at 397-98. 
52. ln administrative law scholarship, this idea was traditionally referred to as the "transmission 
belt" model. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in 
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 470, 470-71 (2003). ln a more recent model of 
the administrative state, the president is the democratically elected principal directing the agencies. 
See generally Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245 (2001). 
53. Sabel & Simon, supra note 41, at 398; see also RUBIN, supra note 8, at 144-45 (similarly 
describing the idea oflegitimacy as medieval, with its origins in determining the status of the king's 
heir in a hereditary monarchy). 
54. Sabel & Simon, supra note 41, at 400,400-01. 
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the alternative concept of "policy and implementation" m understanding 
today's administrative state.55 
C. Can New Governance Achieve Constitutional Status? 
Though some new governance scholars are content to explore its 
domain-specific applications, its most ambitious proponents see it as the 
answer to big questions of constitutional scale. 56 ln Europe, scholars see it as 
the answer to the question: what is the European Unionfor exactly?57 In the 
United States, the question might be: what is the future of liberal constitu-
tional theory?58 Or put differently, what is a progressive vision of the role of 
the state now that our most recent Democratic president has declared the "era 
ofbig [g]overnment" over?59 
But in both places, the questions remain largely the same: is new 
governance as a mode of regulation more of a domain-specific model, or is it 
small-c constitutional? What are the conditions for its success? What are the 
obstacles to its scalability? ls it compatible with existing notions of 
constitutionalism? 
The authors differ on the extent to which new governance mechanisms 
are already a fundamental part of EU constitutionalism. Some note with dis-
appointment that the principal EU new governance mechanism-the Open 
Method of Coordination-was deliberately left out of the EU Constitution 
and constitutional treaties, ostensibly an indicator that it will never play a 
major role.60 Sabel and Simon, however, seem to treat new governance as 
already fundamental, seeing the new governance mechanism of peer review 
as "ubiquitous" in many areas of EU governance, "incipient" in others, and 
55. RUBIN, supra note 8, at 203. 
56. The authors are using the term constitutional in the British sense, not the American version 
hinging on a written constitution. The use here is more akin to the way Mark Tushnet defines a 
"constitutional order" as a "reasonably stable set of institutions through which a nation's 
fundamental decisions are made over a sustained period, and the principles that guide those 
decisions." MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER I (2003). 
57. See Neil Walker, EU Constitutionalism and New Governance, in LAW AND NEW 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 15, 15 (explaining that the relationships between constitutionalism 
and new governance reveal something about the peculiar regulatory dynamic of the European 
Union). 
58. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, A New Constitutionalism for Liberals?, 28 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. 
CHANGE 357, 357 (2003) ("[T]he idea of an experimentalist constitutionalism ... would seem to 
offer an extremely promising course for liberal constitutional theory."); see also William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-statutes: The New American Constitutionalism, in THE LEAST 
EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 320, 321 
(Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006) (arguing for a "new American constitutionalism," 
where important changes in public norms and constitutional principles are developed incrementally 
in legislatures and agencies rather than in courts). 
59. See TUSHNET, supra note 56, at 171-72, ("[D]emocratic experimentalism remains the most 
promising candidate for a theory of government activity in the new constitutional order."). 
60. See, e.g., de Burca & Scott, supra note 18, at II (noting that EU constitutional texts are 
conspicuously devoid of the many European new governance initiatives). 
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"now routinely used" to address new problems and devise new approaches to 
old ones.61 In other work, Sabel has argued that the "deliberative polyarchy" 
at the core of new governance schemes may well be the raison d'etre of the 
European Union.62 New governance may have more currency in the 
European Union simply because the very purpose of the European Union is 
still up for grabs in a way that it is not in the United States. 
ln the United States, the constitutional issue is perhaps more difficult. 
Even before the issue of scalability is faced, there is the challenge of 
compatibility. Can new governance, with its "flagrant disrespect" for the 
distinction between lawmaking and enforcement or implementation be con-
sistent with a constitutional order that relies on separation of powers?63 The 
new governance theorists essentially take the position that strict separation of 
powers is a myth, as evidenced by the frequent need for dialogue among the 
branches of government. 64 
A related objection, particularly from those defending legal liberalism, 
is the perceived need to maintain a robust role for courts in protecting rights. 
In his essay, Tushnet thinks that liberals cannot have it both ways, holding 
onto judicial protection of "fundamental" rights but encouraging innovative, 
nonjudicial methods of enforcement for new rights or values.65 The answer 
that new governance theorists provide is peer review: the use of 
benchmarking institutions to horizontally (unlike the vertical, judicial-review 
model) engage "elements of civil society" in interpreting and protecting fun-
damental values.66 
Even if new governance is compatible with constitutionalism, can it 
reach constitutional scale? ln fact, we currently have an ongoing experiment 
on that very question: the principal domestic policy innovation of the current 
Republican Administration, No Child Left Behind (NCLB). NCLB passed in 
2001 with overwhelming bipartisan support and is currently up for 
reauthorization.67 New governance scholars greeted NCLB, and the state-
61. Sabel & Simon, supra note 41, at 402. 
62. Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Sovereignty and Solidarity: EU and US, in GOVERNING 
WORK AND WELFARE IN A NEW ECONOMY: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIMENTS 345, 362-
73 (Jonathan Zeitlin & David M. Trubek eds., 2003). 
63. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 41, at 398 ("[Nlew governance seems radically unsettling 
because of its flagrant disrespect for the distinction between enactment (or law making) and 
enforcement (or law application) on which principal-agent aceountability depends."). 
64. See id. at 410--11 (discussing the periodic dialogue between different branches of the U.S. 
government). 
65. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Governance and American Political Development, in LAW AND 
NEW GOVERNANCE, supra note 2, at 381, 393 ("[Lliberals simply cannot both (I) be skeptical 
about the importance of the courts in a new constitutional order and still insist, as the interest-group 
constituencies of the older order require (2) that the heart of those constituencies' policy agendas be 
protected by the courts against erosion."). 
66. Sabel & Simon, supra note 41, at 400,407. 
67. Maria Glod, Congress is Urged to Enhance "No Child" Law, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2008, at 
A3. 
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level reforms in Texas and Kentucky on which it was based,68 with great 
excitement.69 The law appears to act at the national level much like the 
European Union's Open Method of Coordination operates at the suprana-
tional level: setting goals but leaving it to the states to come up with plans for 
achieving the goals.70 
Though it constituted an unprecedented federal level of involvement in 
state and local education policy, states and local school districts were granted 
autonomy to devise their own plans for achieving progress, and even for de-
fining the standards themselves. 71 In return, the federal government required 
accountability measures including data to ensure that students, disaggregated 
by race and income, were making "adequate yearly progress."72 Public 
participation was guaranteed by provisions requiring the federal Department 
of Education to include parent representatives on a committee that would 
review the implementing regulations73 and other provisions giving parents 
the right to get information from their school districts about the qualifications 
of their children's teachers.74 
If NCLB is successful, it would be strong evidence that large-scale new 
governance regulation could work in the United States and might have broad 
political support as the basis for any new "constitutional order" in the United 
States.75 
The jury is still out on the success of NCLB. On the positive side-
indeed, this may make anything else mere quibbles-there is substantial 
evidence that the math and reading scores of disadvantaged students have 
gone up since the passage of the law.76 On the other side of the ledger, 
68. See generally James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely 
Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
Soc. CHANGE 183, 231-66 (2003) (discussing education reforms in Texas and Kentucky). 
69. See James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The Federal No Child Left Behind Act and the 
Post-desegregation Civil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1703, 1706 (2003) (praising No Child 
Left Behind because it "encourages the development of just the kind of locally, experientially, and 
consensually generated standards whose absence in the past has discouraged courts from carrying 
through with their initial commitments to desegregated, educationally effective schools"); Liebman 
& Sabel, supra note 68, at 304 (observing that the school-reform movement "commands attention as 
an innovative response by civil society and the courts to the remaking of the schools"). 
70. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 69, at 1721-24 (discussing the standards set for state 
education by No Child Left Behind). 
71. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § llll(b)(l)(A), 115 Stat. 1425, 
1444 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (Supp. V 2005)). 
72. !d. § llll(b)(2)(C), 115 Stat. at 1446. 
73. See id. § llll(e)(l)(B), 115 Stat. at 1456. 
74. !d. § llll(h)(6)(A), 115 Stat. at 1461. 
75. See TUSHNET, supra note 56, at I (defining "constitutional order" as "a reasonably stable 
set of institutions through which a nation's fundamental decisions are made over a sustained period, 
and the principles that guide those decisions"). 
76. See CTR. ON EDUC. POLiCY, ANSWERING THE QUESTION THAT MATTERS MOST: HAS 
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT INCREASED SINCE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND? 51-60 (2007) (describing a 
narrowing of the gap between students from historically lower performing subgroups and those 
from historically higher performing subgroups, while average test scores increased overall). The 
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teachers report increased time "teach[ing] to the test," which may crowd out 
other important educational goals.77 Scholars and policymakers have raised 
the question of whether the benefits of the law outweigh the unintended con-
sequences of NCLB, including encouraging states to lower academic 
standards, pushing poor and minority students out of schools, and creating an 
environment that discourages strong teachers from taking jobs in schools 
with high numbers of disadvantaged students.78 
Is this a successful regulatory model both for educational policy and 
other domains? Again, the jury is still out. For new governance scholars, the 
model's strength is its ability to learn from experience and update both the 
goals of the regulatory scheme and the means in light of experience. In the 
NCLB context, states can both learn from their own experience and the ex-
perience of other states through the benchmarking coordinated at the federal 
level. But when one talks about experimenting at a local level in light of un-
certainty about how best to proceed, one thinks of the familiar idea of states 
as "laboratories of democracy." 
So how exactly is this different? Indeed, one of Louise Trubek's main 
examples of new governance in U.S. health care, the federal State Children's 
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), sounds like plain old federalism, 
providing money to insure more children but allowing states to come up with 
programs for how to do it.79 In his essay on "new environmental 
governance," Bradley Karkkainen describes the Clean Air Act as a 
"cooperative federalism" scheme where the federal Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) establishes standards and leaves it to the states to develop 
"State Implementation Plans" to regulate emissions, and monitor and enforce 
compliance. 80 If the EPA deems the state plan inadequate, a "Federal 
Implementation Plan" serves as a backstop, and Karkkainen points to this 
arrangement as an innovative "regulatory penalty default" scheme.81 But it is 
not clear how distinctive these regulatory schemes are from many others in 
our system of federalism. 
Even if it is different, is the new governance, NCLB model really 
better? One leading scholar of education policy, Harvard's Richard Elmore, 
thinks not, pointing out that before NCLB, states were experimenting with 
various kinds of performance-based accountability, but NCLB "narrows the 
domain of experimentation drastically and hence limits the amount we can 
causal link to passage of the law, however, is far from clear. See id. at 4 ("We cannot say to what 
extent test scores have gone up because ofNCLB .... "). 
77. COMM'N ON No CHILD LEFT BEHIND, ASPEN lNST., BEYOND NCLB 19 (2007); see id. 
(relating claims that the high-stakes nature of an annual-testing procedure has driven teachers to 
emphasize rote instruction of the subjects being tested over creative learning techniques). 
78. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 932, 934 (2004). 
79. See Trubek, supra note 30, at 259-61. 
80. Karkkainen, supra note 33, at 308. 
81. !d. at 309. 
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know."82 Annual testing is one way to measure performance, but it is not the 
only way and may not be the best way. Under NCLB, it is the mandatory 
way.s3 
From a different direction, scholars have criticized NCLB for its mix of 
federal involvement with flexibility left to the states-precisely the recipe 
prescribed by new governance advocates. As James Ryan puts it, perhaps 
the federal government "should get off the federalism fence."84 Either the 
political and institutional dynamics are such that the states can be trusted to 
establish and enforce strong academic standards or they cannot. And if they 
cannot, then perhaps the federal government ought to just prescribe national 
standards, as was supported by the first President Bush and by President 
Clinton.85 To be sure, perhaps political reality would stand in the way of 
such standards-but that is not the new governance proponents' argument. 
Their argument is that providing states flexibility is better as a policy matter 
because of the uncertainty about ends and means.86 
D. The Future of New Governance Scholarship 
Going forward, the new governance scholarship would do well to focus 
more on the conditions for success, as the best of the essays in this volume 
do. Susan Sturm's work on gender equity, for example, highlights the role of 
problem-solving intermediaries like the National Science Foundation, which 
are trusted by all parties and build up institutional knowledge by learning 
from experience.87 One question this raises is whether administrative agen-
cies themselves can be such problem-solving intermediaries. 
Another question is whether the threat of either litigation or more top-
down regulation is necessary to induce the regulated entities to engage in 
collaborative efforts. Hervey's chapter on health care in the European 
Union, for example, traces how a new governance scheme arose out of 
private litigation88-a context that is explored in other work by Susan Sturm 
on employment discrimination. Sturm shows how Horne Depot settled class 
actions in the United States alleging a pattern and practice of discrimination 
82. Richard F. Elmore, Details, Details, Details, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 315, 318 
(2003). 
83. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(3) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (setting forth requirements that each 
state implement academic assessments for students in mathematics, reading or language arts, and 
science). 
84. Ryan, supra note 78, at 987. 
85. See id. at 988 (noting that both the first President Bush and President Clinton advocated 
national standards). 
86. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 69, at 1715, 1712-15 (arguing that providing states with a 
framework within which they are free to question and experiment with means ultimately triggers a 
"race to the top in educational performance" and facilitates redress for those schools and 
populations that do not benefit initially from that raee to improve). 
87. See Sturm, supra note 17, at 337, 337-39 (describing the National Science Foundation's 
role as a problem-solving intermediary). 
88. Hervey, supra note 28, at 180-81. 
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in part by implementing problem-solving mechanisms into the corporate 
culture.89 It may well be that the success of new governance depends in part 
on the old, hoary topic of the law of remedies. 
New governance scholarship would also benefit from attention to the 
differences in culture and governmental structure across countries. Though 
in this volume the authors specified that their task was not "deliberately 
comparative,"90 future work should also focus on the differences between the 
European Union and the United States and discuss why new governance 
schemes might work better in one and not the other. 
Greater attention to the conditions for success, and the context in which 
new governance schemes arise, will lead to more careful definition of the 
regulatory problem. Recall Michael Dorf's definition: "[l]n the conditions of 
modem life, people increasingly find that their problem is not so much an 
inability to persuade those with ·different interests or viewpoints of what to 
do; their problem is that no one has a complete solution to what collectively 
ails them."91 On this account, developed in this book by Simon's account of 
Toyota jurisprudence, constant questioning and collaboration lead to better 
solutions.92 But the problem with Simon's analogy is that on the Toyota pro-
duction floor, all the problem solvers are on the same team. When teachers' 
unions, parents, and school districts are collaborating, the interests may not 
be quite as harmonious. 
Perhaps the most fruitful question going forward is how to capture other 
kinds of regulatory methods. Think about new governance regulation as an 
umbrella term covering a kind of interaction between the state, regulated 
entities, and other stakeholders that has a number of desiderata-public 
participation, data provision, transparency, benchmarking, sharing of best 
practices, fora for deliberation on ends and means, and autonomy and flexi-
bility for those subject to regulation. 
The question for new governance proponents and policymakers is how 
best to maximize the number of areas of regulation that contain these 
features. To do so, we need to look more broadly and deeply at the political 
economy of policymaking and implementation. In order to scale up, new 
governance scholars and practitioners need to follow more of their own ad-
vice about breaking down, or analyzing across, the traditional boundaries of 
policymaking and implementation. 
89. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 
101 COLUM. L. REv. 458, 512, 510-12 (2001) ("The solution was to achieve accountability through 
technology, information systems, and systematizing discretion, rather than through rules."). But see 
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 487, 516--17 (2003) (arguing that this kind of "negotiated governance" model, that of a 
compliance regime internal to organizations, has led to lawyer-driven inefficiencies). 
90. De Bllrca & Scott, supra note 18, at 1. 
91. Dorf, supra note 12, at 1269. 
92. See Simon, supra note 39, at 48-50. 
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The new governance experiments to date in the United States fall 
largely into two categories: ( 1) areas where centralized regulation is well es-
tablished but controversial among those regulated and (2) attempts to solve 
intractable social problems. As to the former, environmental and 
occupational-health-and-safety regulation are the two most prominent 
examples. In these areas, businesses subject to regulation have substantial 
complaints about the burdens of existing command-and-control regulation. 
As they have had increased success in the public and other domains in push-
ing for deregulation, policymakers and others have searched for a middle 
ground.93 
The second category, what 1 refer to as intractable social problems, is 
made up of problems that primarily concern individuals not well represented 
in the political arena but that frequently gamer public attention. These in-
clude drug abuse,94 education for the disadvantaged,95 and even gender bias 
in higher education. 96 
But these two categories leave out vast swaths of economic and other 
activity that are, or might be, subject to some kind of regulation. Consider 
the category of activities that are centered in one industry or a handful of 
industries, but cause harm to the public, by looking at two examples of recent 
vintage: data privacy and childhood obesity. 
In data privacy, a series of well-publicized gaffes and identity thefts 
from data brokers, like ChoicePoint, led to litigation, calls for regulation at 
the state and federal levels, and other measures.97 With childhood obesity, it 
was a report by the Institute of Medicine, a congressional advisory body, that 
put the issue on the public agenda and led advocacy and public-health groups 
93. See Freeman, supra note 10, at 97-98 (acknowledging that health-and-safety and 
environmental regulation may be particularly promising areas for collaboration because "the 
regulated industries in these sectors have accepted the inevitability of regulation and are willing to 
discuss implementation"). 
94. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent 
Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REv. 831 (2000) (discussing drug courts as a novel form 
of governance). 
95. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 69, at 1737-41 (noting that Kentucky education-
governance reforms created frameworks for grassroots organizations focused on identifYing the 
causes of achievement gaps among disadvantaged groups); Liebman & Sabel, supra note 68, at 238 
(noting that Texas education accountability reforms had the goal of closing "the achievement gap 
between property-rich and property-poor districts" (quoting Edgewood lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 
917 S.W.2d 717,728-29 (Tex. 1995))). 
96. See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 17, at 325 ("Recently, a different public approaeh to the 
problem has emerged to address women's marginalisation and under-participation in universities, 
particularly in the sciences."). 
97. See Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the Misuse of Personal 
Information, 66 Mo. L. REV. 140, 154-58 (2006) (describing data security breaches and the ensuing 
state and federal legislative responses). 
836 Texas Law Review [Vol. 86:819 
to call for regulation of the food and beverage industry concerning sales and 
marketing to children.98 
ln both these circumstances, there was little to no regulation of the 
relevant industry before the issue became one of public concern (no 
regulation of data brokers on information privacy99 and no regulation of the 
food and beverage industry on sales and marketing to children100). And the 
problem here is not, contra the democratic experimentalists, that the relevant 
stakeholders agree on the ultimate goal but are having trouble figuring out 
how best to get there. The problem here is a fundamental conflict between 
the interests of the companies that want to maximize profits and the public 
that bears the burden of the externalities of these profit-making enterprises. 
The issue for the public is how best to balance these interests and by what 
means. 
ln both these circumstances--data privacy and childhood obesity-the 
industries responded to the threat of litigation and government regulation 
with a tactic 1 call preemptive self-regulation. ln order to forestall the drive 
toward government regulation, the industries simply announced and began to 
implement regulation themselves. 101 
For scholars and policymakers seeking an alternative to command-and-
control regulation, chastened by experience, and recognizing the limits of 
administrative agencies, this might seem like a good outcome. Indeed, much 
of the new governance and related literature relies in part on a strategy of 
relying on the regulated entities to do more themselves in light of govern-
ment agencies' inherent limits. 102 Even for some progressives, self-
regulation holds promise. 103 
98. For an overview (though not an unbiased one), see Michele Simon, Can Food Companies 
Be Trusted to Self-Regulate? An Analysis of Corporate Lobbying and Deception to Undermine 
Children's Health, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 169 (2006) and Michele Simon, Food Marketing to 
Children and the Law: An Introduction, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. I (2006). 
99. See Brian Deagon, High-Profile Online Data Thefts Irk Pols, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAlLY, 
Aug. 22, 2005, at A4 (describing a number of bills under consideration introduced in response to 
data security breaches and predicting closer regulation of data brokers). 
IOO. See Tracy Westen, Government Regulation of Food Marketing to Children: The Federal 
Trade Commission and the Kid-Vid Controversy, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 79 (tracing the development 
and demise of several plans to regulate the marketing of food to children). 
IOI. See Ellen J. Fried, Assessing Effectiveness of Self-Regulation: A Case Study of the 
Children's Advertising Review Unit, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 93 (describing the inception of and 
various changes to the Children's Advertising Review Unit as a self-regulating tool for the 
advertising industry); Tom Zeller Jr., Investigators Fear Curbs on Personal Data, INT'L HERALD 
TRIB., Mar. 22, 2005, at IR (relating the decision made by the Federal Trade Commission to permit 
a working group made up of database companies to establish self-regulating guidelines in lieu of 
federal regulation). 
102. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 
551-56 (2000) (describing the pervasive role of private entities in regulation, service provision, 
policy design, and implementation); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, lOS 
COLUM. L. REv. 2029, 2037-40 (2005) (discussing the role of private-governance scholarship in 
developing a more robust view of the role of private entities in regulation); Symposium, New Forms 
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But new governance scholars ought to have a story for policymakers 
and a strategy for how to tum these attempts at preemptive self-regulation 
into the kind of new governance schemes that will produce positive policy 
outcomes on the underlying issues. For data privacy, an industry group 
might be tasked with coordinating and publicizing best practices on how 
companies can protect data privacy. For childhood obesity, the Institute of 
Medicine could produce periodic company-by-company reports on the mar-
keting of soda and high-sugar foods to kids. In a world of regulatory 
pluralism, where different modes of regulation are best in different contexts, 
trying to maximize the number of desirable features (transparency, 
benchmarking, etc.) of any regime may be the best that a regulatory theory 
can do. 
III. The Regulatory and Administrative State 
A. Public Law in Legal Education 
Since the rise of the administrative state in the United States, legal 
education has struggled to incorporate "public law" courses into its 
curriculum. The first courses to appear were administrative law courses, 
dealing with the process by which agencies do rulemaking, judicial review, 
and other related topics. Shortly thereafter, legislation courses grew, 
introducing students to the legislative process and how to read and interpret 
statutes. 104 After World War 11, two professors at Harvard, Henry Hart and 
Albert Sacks, developed what grew to be legendary materials called The 
Legal Process. 105 These materials introduced students to the different ways 
that society can deal with public problems, including regulation through ad-
ministrative agencies. 
The administrative law and legislation courses have remained staples of 
the upper-level curriculum, and though the "Legal Process" was taught in 
dozens of law schools in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, it is now taught in 
only a handful. In the meantime, many law schools have moved toward re-
quiring some kind of public law course as part of the first-year curriculum. 106 
Though some schools did this through an administrative law or legislation 
course, others, such as Columbia and Georgetown, developed a "regulatory 
of Governance: Ceding Public Power to Private Actors, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687 (2002) (reviewing 
broadly the various ways in which private actors have entered the public sphere). 
103. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-
Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 319 (2005) (viewing the rise in self-regulation as an opportunity to 
improve employee rights through the use of independent monitors). 
104. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & PhilipP. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction 
to The Legal Process, in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at lxix-lxx (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
PhilipP. Frickey eds., 1994). 
105. See HART & SACKS, supra note 104. 
106. Ethan J. Leib, Adding Legislation Courses to the First-Year Curriculum, 58 J. LEGAL 
Eouc. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 3 n.9, on file with author). 
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state" course that focused in large part on questions of institutional or regu-
latory design. 107 With Harvard's recent adoption of a Legislation and 
Regulation course into the required first-year curriculum and Vanderbilt's 
dean and a leading regulatory-state scholar, Edward Rubin, leading 
curricular-reform efforts both at his own school and through the AALS, the 
issue has come to the fore again. 108 
B. Heinzerling and Tushnet 's Approach 
1. The Book's Strategy.-Into the mix step Harvard's Mark Tushnet 
and Georgetown's Lisa Heinzerling with their new book, The Regulatory and 
Administrative State. This is a new casebook designed to fill the void in the 
market-where demand may also grow if other schools follow Harvard's 
lead and require such a course-for materials to teach an introductory course 
in public law. On the question of whether such a course should be required, 
Tushnet and Heinzerling are clear in the Preface: "Lawyers in the twenty-
first century need course materials of this sort. They are deeply involved in 
public law and the regulatory state, and need the skills-including the ability 
to read and understand statutes-associated with the modem regulatory 
state."109 At this stage, the question of whether law students need the 
"skills ... associated with the modem regulatory state" is not controversial. 
The issue is whether or not this book provides them. 
The book takes as its theme the regulation of risks to human life and 
health. In exploring how the law regulates these areas, the book considers 
recurring issues of institutional choice, statutory interpretation, and market 
and regulatory failure. And it is quite different from a standard administra-
tive law or legislation book. 
The book proceeds in four parts. First, it considers the basic 
justifications for regulation in circumstances where the individual parties 
contract. Second, it explores the contours of common law regulation of risks 
to human life and health through both criminal and tort law. Third, the book 
takes up the emergence of the modem regulatory state as a response to the 
perceived failure of common law regulation of risk. In doing so, it offers an 
introduction to statutory interpretation, administrative law, and public-choice 
theory. Finally, the book closes with a section on "new perspectives" on the 
regulatory and administrative state in the twenty-first century, exploring 
107. Tushnet taught the course at Georgetown for many years before his recent move to 
Harvard, and The Regulatory and Administrative State book is an outgrowth of the materials he 
used to teach that course. In tum, such a course was the descendant of the Law in Society course 
that the Wisconsin legal historian Willard Hurst developed in the 1930s and I940s with Wisconsin's 
then-dean Lloyd Garrison. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 104, at lxx-lxxiii. 
I 08. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text. 
109. HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 4, at x. 
2008] Law and Governance in the 21st Century Regulatory State 839 
some of the same issues explored in greater depth in Law and New 
Governance. 110 
The book starts in Chapter 1 with the limits of private ordering-more 
precisely, the problem of "justifying regulation when parties have a contract 
with each other" 111-by introducing occupational health risks, and the tradi-
tional constitutional and common law legal response that such risks were 
accounted for in the contract between employer and employee. 112 Then in 
Chapter 2, the authors present an economic perspective suggesting both that 
legal rules should provide appropriate incentives for future conduct and that 
occupational health risks should be factored into the "wage premium" in the 
contract between employer and employee. 113 Chapter 3 introduces 
"alternative perspectives" that might bear on the regulation of workplace 
health and safety, specifically the ideas that certain aspects of personhood 
ought to be "inalienable" in the marketplace, that unequal bargaining power 
might mean that the acceptance of risk in the workplace is not truly 
voluntary, and that distributive and paternalistic considerations can trump 
"freedom of contract." 114 
In Part II, the authors explore the doctrinal and institutional limits of the 
common law. Having already explored some of the limits of contract law in 
regulating risk, Chapter 4 looks at criminal and tort law. This is perhaps the 
most interesting chapter in the book and has moments of pedagogical 
brilliance. The authors start with the statutory definitions of murder in 
California and Pennsylvania and then reproduce a 1973 memo by a General 
Motors engineer that became well known in auto-accident litigation for its 
cost-benefit analysis of designing safer gas tanks. 115 Through the 
"comments and questions," the authors show how the necessary criminal 
intent for murder does not quite fit the paradigm of businesses doing cost-
benefit analyses about product design. 116 Moreover, in the notes, the authors 
put the students in the position of lawyers advising their clients and ask what 
possible courses of action they would counsel. 117 Then the authors tum to 
the limits of tort law in regulating risk, looking at a toxic-tort case in New 
Jersey and an attempt to use statistical evidence to prove causation in an 
auto-accident case. 118 These cases nicely illustrate the limits of courts' 
capacity to determine and compensate for exposure to risk. 
110. Although the authors call it a casebook, excerpts from cases are equaled if not 
outnumbered by excerpts from scholarly articles. 
Ill. HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 4, at x. 
112. See id. at 3-36. 
113. See id. at 37-52. 
114. See id. at 53-108. 
115. See id. at 111-13. 
116. See id. at 113-14. 
117. Seeid. 
118. See id. at 128-55. 
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Chapter 5, "Institutional Strengths and Limits,"119 then turns squarely to 
a theme that will recur throughout the rest of the book-that of comparative 
institutional analysis, or institutional competence. The authors present ex-
cerpts from two law-review articles that nicely introduce many of the 
considerations relevant to deciding among courts (adjudicating under tort or 
criminal law), administrative agencies (promulgating rules under a statutory 
framework), and the market in terms of which best regulates risk. 120 They 
also excerpt materials on the sociology of claiming legal rights, 121 explaining 
that the "naming, blaming, claiming" of how disputes do or do not enter the 
legal system affects how any particular scheme of risk regulation will work, 
and is a welcome "law in action" addition to thinking about comparative in-
stitutional analysis. 122 
In guiding students' reflections on such matters, the authors put the 
students, implicitly, in the role of policymakers, asking questions like "what 
is the best institution to use in responding to" work-related carpal tunnel 
syndrome, climate change, and other issues?123 As I explain further below, 
this perspective of the policymaker, or what the authors refer to later in the 
book as the disinterested social scientist, 124 is the primary perspective from 
which the authors approach these materials. 
More promising, in my view, are the too-rare instances where students 
are asked to think about the role of lawyers. In this chapter, for example, 
students are asked to think about how lawyers affect the process by which 
individuals complain about workplace sexual harassment or secondhand 
smoke-even here, though, the students are asked to play social scientists 
thinking about the role of lawyers, not thinking as lawyers themselves. 125 
As Tushnet's former Wisconsin colleague, the late Willard Hurst, did in 
his Law in Society course designed in the late 1930s, 126 the authors in 
Chapter 6 use the tale of workers' compensation to show how a statutory 
framework for regulating risk emerged from dissatisfaction on all sides with 
the common law. 127 They provide excerpts from articles exploring the con-
cept of "moral hazard" used by economists to indicate a possible downside 
for workers' compensation schemes-workers, knowing that they will be 
compensated for injury, do not have sufficient incentive to take care to 
119. /d. at 205. 
120. See id. at 205-31. 
121. !d. at 231-45. 
122. /d. at 231-39 (excerpting William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and 
Transformation of Disputes: Naming. Blaming. Claiming ... , 15 LAW & Soc'y REV. 631 (1980-
1981)). 
123. /d. at 231. 
124. /d. at 683. 
125. See id. at 239-40. 
126. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 104, at lxxi. 
127. See id. at 275-95. 
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prevent such injuries. 128 And they also include articles to point out some of 
the limits of workers' compensation, particularly in the area of occupational 
disease. 129 
Part lll, "The Modem Regulatory State,"130 is the core of the book, 
introducing students to statutory interpretation, the basics of administrative 
law, and some modem features of contemporary regulation including cost-
benefit analysis and information provision. The authors provide a solid in-
troduction to the key administrative law topics of rulemaking, judicial 
review, standard setting, and nondelegation, primarily through the principal 
Supreme Court cases and a few circuit opinions applying those cases. 131 To 
be sure, future lawyers in a regulatory practice would have to take the full 
administrative law course, but others could be confident that they have a de-
cent foundation. And the authors present interesting materials on regulatory 
design: cost-benefit analysis; some of the ways that regulatory efforts fail; 
and how providing information can be a market-based solution to regulating 
risk, but one that also has its limits, as psychological research presented here 
indicates. 132 
But the materials on statutory interpretation are inadequate, covering 
only one chapter and arguably not even that. This is a serious flaw. The 
materials on statutory interpretation consist of excerpts from a few classic 
articles-by Karl Llewellyn, Frank Easterbrook, and Stephen Breyer-to 
provide an excellent introduction to the overall approach in interpreting 
statutes. 133 These articles are followed by two cases: one, the classic Holy 
Trinity134 case, demonstrates the conflict between statutory purpose and text; 
the second, a Seventh Circuit opinion interpreting the Sentencing 
Guidelines, 135 features interesting, dueling opinions from Judges Posner and 
Easterbrook. 136 After that, the authors go right to Chevron, 137 the classic 
Supreme Court case about judicial deference to agency interpretation of 
statutes, and a more recent case on that topic, Brown and Williamson. 138 
The canons of statutory interpretation barely appear. Other than a table 
from the Llewelyn excerpt listing the statutory canons and the responses to 
128. See HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 295-306. 
129. See id. at 306-15. 
130. !d. at 317. 
131. Seeid. at415-60,613-82. 
132. See id. at 461-611. 
133. See id. at 3!9-49. 
134. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
135. United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990), affd sub nom. Chapman v. 
United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991). 
136. See HE1NZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 350-77 (excerpting Holy Trinity and 
Marshall). 
137. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
138. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); see HEINZERLING & 
TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 378-412 (providing text and discussion of Chevron and Brown & 
Williamson). 
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each, 139 there is no exploration of how those canons are used. Perhaps the 
authors are fully persuaded by the idea that Llewellyn introduced in his clas-
sic article that "there are two opposing canons on almost every point."140 As 
a result, the authors ask in comments and questions section: "Given the 
availability of competing canons of interpretation, what use are they?"141 But 
Llewellyn also said unambiguously about the canons: "Every lawyer must be 
familiar with them all: they are still needed tools of argument." 142 Either the 
authors disagree, or they have unwisely chosen to put the canons beyond the 
scope of the book. 
At the close of Part III, the authors take a welcome tum from the 
perspective of a "disinterested social scientist" to the perspective of 
"politicians."143 In Chapter 13, they introduce public-choice theory, the 
microeconomic approach that looks at the self-interested incentives that 
politicians have in making regulatory choices. 144 Politicians want to run for 
reelection, they need to raise money for such a campaign, and their choices 
are shaped by these realities. 145 Besides the excerpts from public-choice 
theory, the authors include an interesting excerpt from the Harvard political 
theorist Jane Mansbridge questioning the premises of public-choice theory 
with its focus on self-interestedness, its acceptance of adversary democracy, 
and the absence of "deliberation" from this view of public life. 146 No doubt 
the new governance scholars would agree with these objections to public-
choice theory. But all must face the question of how exactly to get past the 
reality of "adversary democracy" and toward the aspiration of greater delib-
eration in public life, a theme I will return to below. 
In ending Part III's tour of the modem regulatory state, the authors 
present a view of "[ s Jetting [ r ]egulatory [p ]riorities" by looking at worker 
safety. 147 An article by the sociologist Andrew Szasz provides an excellent 
look at the context surrounding passage of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act, including the mine disaster and the resulting publicity and hear-
ings that pushed through passage of the law. 148 The article also recounts the 
strategic options facing industry on implementation-how closely to work 
139. HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 325-27 (exeerpting Karl Llewellyn, Remarks 
on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be 
Construed, 3 V AND. L. REv. 395 (1950)). 
140. Id. at 324 (quoting Llewellyn, supra note 139, at 401). 
141. Id. at 327. 
142. Id. (quoting Llewellyn, supra note 139, at 401). 
143. Id. at 683. 
144. See id. at 683-705. 
145. See id. at 683. 
146. See id. at 721, 716-22 (excerpting and quoting Jane Mansbridge, Self-interest in Political 
Life, 18 POL. THEORY 132 (1990)). 
147. Id. at 723, 723-50. 
148. See id. at 723-35 (excerpting Andrew Szasz, Industrial Resistance to Occupational Safety 
and Health Legislation: 1971-1981,32 Soc. PROBS. 103 (1984)). 
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with the new agency, OSHA, and how much to try to undermine the law. 149 
The section would benefit from asking students to reflect upon how they 
would approach these options as lawyers representing businesses, but the 
basic approach of looking at the context in which regulatory schemes arise 
and are implemented is not only valuable here but is also one from which the 
Law and New Governance volume could benefit. 
Heinzerling and Tushnet close the book with a two-chapter part called 
"The Regulatory and Administrative State in the Twenty-First Century: New 
Perspectives."150 The part consists of a chapter on comparative perspectives 
on the problem of regulating risk, focusing primarily on studies of environ-
mental regulation in Great Britain and Japan. 151 And the final chapter, 
"Proposals for Reform," has a significant emphasis on the new-governance-
style mechanisms described in de Burca and Scott's collection. 152 
2. Success on Its Own Terms?-This book is ambitious. On the theory 
that students will learn more by "seeing the subjects in a unified course," 
Heinzerling and Tushnet designed the book as an introduction to "the reasons 
for regulation, the ways in which regulation can go awry, the choice of legal 
institutions for regulation, the choice of regulatory instruments, and the the-
ory and practice of statutory interpretation."153 But in attempting to do so 
much, the authors risk accomplishing relatively little. The authors believe 
that today's lawyers need to have "both an understanding of statutory inter-
pretation and an understanding of the reasons for regulation."154 
But it is not clear why exactly they need the latter. To be sure, when 
Willard Hurst first designed such a course at Wisconsin in the 1940s, the 
place of the administrative state itself was much more tenuous. 155 In that 
context, a course that spent some time demonstrating the limits of the 
common law or the need for scientific expertise as part of the Executive 
Branch might have made sense. But today, the administrative state is an in-
escapable part of our legal system. No one is suggesting that it is 
unnecessary in our complex modern society. 
And so, with choices to make about what precisely law students need in 
perhaps the only course they will take on the regulatory state, I am not sure 
that a few chapters carefully, and even compellingly, teasing out the very 
reason for its existence is the best use of scarce resources. In focusing so 
heavily on the reasons for regulation and the choice of regulatory 
149. !d. at 728-35. 
150. !d. at 751. 
151. See id. at 753-91. 
152. See id. at 793, 793-822. 
153. !d. at ix. 
154. !d. at x. 
155. See Daniel R. Ernst, Willard Hurst and the Administrative State: From Williams to 
Wisconsin, 18 L. & HIST. REV. I, 34 (2000) (noting Hurst's concern that the complex problems 
facing modernity required a new "use [of] law in all its forms to address the needs of society"). 
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instruments, the authors have designed a book ideal for a third-year elective 
in law school or a required course at a public-policy school, but less than 
ideal for a required course in law school. 156 
To be sure, a few unnecessary chapters might not be the worst sin 
committed by casebook authors, or a particularly uncommon one. And 
Heinzerling and Tushnet have designed the book intentionally for professors 
who want to use this book's basic "spine" for a course that focuses on sub-
stantive issues other than those of risk regulation that constitute the "ribs" of 
this particular book and course. 157 
But the focus on the reasons for regulation means that the spine itself is 
not strong enough. Of the five topics that Heinzerling and Tushnet aim to 
cover in the book-"rationales for regulation, choices among institutions, 
choices of regulatory instruments, regulatory failures, and statutory 
interpretation"158-the last one is the most important for lawyers to learn and 
learn well, but it is the weakest in the book. After all, many lawyers will not 
have the kind of practice that involves proceedings before the Federal 
Communications Commission, for example, but all will have to deal with 
statutes, even in practices that are purely transactional or heavily focused on 
private law or commercial litigation. 
What is needed is more of an approach that focuses on training future 
lawyers to make arguments about how to interpret statutes. Put simply, 
depending on the client and the situation, a lawyer will have to argue either 
that a client or his conduct is or is not covered by a statutory provision-and 
future lawyers need to be trained to make these kinds of arguments the same 
way they are trained to make doctrinal arguments. To make matters worse, 
most legislation courses do not focus on teaching this skill either. The lead-
ing textbook for legislation courses, for example, authored by prominent 
scholars on statutory interpretation,159 underemphasizes the goal of providing 
future lawyers a "toolkit" of statutory arguments to use on behalf of 
clients. 160 
156. For a thoughtful discussion of this "second-generation" question of what a required public 
law course ought to cover, including a similar critique of the Tushnet and Heinzerling approach, see 
Leib, supra note 106 (manuscript at 18-19). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Three Ages of 
Legislation Pedagogy, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 3, 7-9 (2003) for a discussion of several 
different approaches. 
157. HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 4, at ix-x. 
158. !d. at ix. 
159. WILLIAM M. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIPP. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (3d ed. 200 I). 
160. A better approach, which emphasizes the craft of making statutory arguments, while 
containing enough theory to ground the students in why exactly they are making these kinds of 
arguments, is contained in an excellent new book, LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID CHARLES HRICIK, 
MODERN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: PROBLEMS, THEORIES, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES 
(2006). 
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C. The Lost Pedagogical Legacy of Hart and Sacks 
For generations, students at Harvard Law School and elsewhere learned 
about the contours of the regulatory state through Hart and Sacks's The Legal 
Process. 161 In the wake of criticism from the "crits" on the left and public-
choice economists on the right, the approach embodied in The Legal Process 
has been largely discredited in the academy. 162 Unfortunately, its discredit-
ing as a scholarly approach has led to the loss of the pedagogical approach 
embodied in the materials as well. Here, I argue that a book like Heinzerling 
and Tushnet's would benefit from reclaiming this lost pedagogical legacy. 
Where Heinzerling and Tushnet begin the book with the problem of 
justifying regulation when parties have a contract with each other, 163 Hart 
and Sacks begin with a much more mundane, and literally messy, problem: 
the problem of spoiled cantaloupes.164 In this problem, famous to genera-
tions of Legal Process students at Harvard and elsewhere, students are put 
into the position of counseling a man who received a shipment of spoiled 
cantaloupes and asked to consider: What are the client's options?165 And 
Hart and Sacks provide the relevant regulatory and other background to al-
low for thoughtful discussion and consideration of those options. Though 
more mundane, this problem is more pedagogically useful because it places 
students in the role of lawyers. And this placing students into "role" has 
been emphasized by scholars of legal education, most recently in the 
Carnegie Foundation's Educating Lawyers. 166 
So when Heinzerling and Tushnet discuss questions of institutional 
competence, they ask which institution is "best" for regulating different kinds 
of risk, with best being defined by a disinterested social scientist or 
policymaker. 167 But as the authors indicate in their public-choice chapter, no 
policymakers are disinterested, at least not the ones who want to be 
reelected. 168 And certainly no lawyers are. This is a flaw that both books 
share-the new governance scholars devote a fair amount of attention to 
undermining the traditional principal-agent relationship where legislators 
hand down rules for agencies to interpret, but they ignore entirely another 
critical principal-agent relationship, that of clients and lawyers. In other 
161. HART & SACKS, supra note 104. 
162. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 104, at li, cxix-cxx (citing general critiques from law 
professors arguing that the theory embodied in The Legal Process rested upon an inadequate theory 
of democracy and a flawed theory of adjudication). 
163. HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 4, at I. 
164. HART & SACKS, supra note I 04, at I 0-12. 
165. !d. at 11-12. 
166. See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 22 (2007). 
167. See, e.g., HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 231 (asking which institution, given 
a particular framework, is best to use in responding to a variety of social issues). 
168. See id. at 683 ("[T]he premise [of public-choice theory] is that the kind of self-interested 
behavior one sees in markets can also be seen in the political realm."). 
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words, lawyers are heavily involved in shaping these institutional choices on 
behalf of clients. And future lawyers ought to engage in guided reflection on 
how they might go about doing so. 
Rather than asking what is the "best" institution to deal with work-
related carpal tunnel syndrome, for example, one might more fruitfully ask: 
What if you were a lawyer for a union and started to receive a number of 
complaints from employees about such injuries? Would you bring a product-
liability lawsuit against the maker of the machine causing such injuries? 
Would you bring it to the attention of OSHA even though there was no spe-
cific standard covering such injuries? Would you support the development 
of a federal ergonomics standard that mandates rest breaks at specified inter-
vals for certain jobs, for example, or support simply mandating employers to 
come up with a plan for minimizing such injuries? Would you try to get 
measures to help prevent such injuries into the next collective-bargaining 
agreement? 
In order to have informed reflections on such issues, of course, students 
would need to be provided with background on all these possibilities. 169 
Such an exercise starts to look a lot like the one Hart and Sacks led genera-
tions of students through in the case of the spoiled cantaloupes. Indeed, a 
key pedagogical innovation of Hart and Sacks's materials was their use of 
the "problem method" as a vehicle for introducing students to the issues of 
public and private ordering at the heart of the materials. 170 As Hart once put 
it in a letter: 
[K]nowledge consists, not in doctrine, not in propositional statements 
stored away in the brain; but in the capacity to solve problems as they 
are actually presented in life; the capacity to see all the 
implications ... of the action to be taken; the capacity to bring to bear 
in the taking of decisions the maximum of the available experience of 
mankind. 171 
Students should take a course on the regulatory state, but on lawyering, 
not policymaking. Such a course might ask students to play the role of the 
lawyer for a teachers' union, school district, or state or federal department of 
education; provide them with the statute and the accompanying regulations; 
and ask them to make arguments supporting their client's position. Such a 
169. This kind of approach, akin to the business-school case method, is proposed by two 
professors who spent considerable time thinking about legal education as part of Harvard's recent 
curricular-reform effort. See Todd D. Rakoff & Martha Minow, A Case for Another Case Method, 
60 VAND. L. REV. 597, 604, 603-05 (2007) ("[Wle are members of a committee that is presently 
recommending to our faculty a set of curricular revisions that include[sl the creation of problem-
solving materials of this sort .... "). 
170. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 104, at lxxv (discussing a precursor to Hart and 
Sacks's materials). 
171. !d. at lxxvi (quoting an October 15, 1941 letter from Henry M. Hart, Jr. to John H. 
Williams, who was then Dean of the Graduate School of Public Administration at Harvard 
University). 
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course might ask students to consider how they might propose changing the 
law-as advocates for a particular client-in the context of, for example, the 
current reauthorization debate on NCLB. 
To be sure, the line between lawyering and policymaking is not always 
so clear, and indeed, students should be trained in both evaluating the effects 
of and advocating for particular policies. But the perspective ought to be that 
of a lawyer with a client, not that of a disinterested regulator or social 
scientist. 
Note that this is a different critique than the familiar one that legal 
education is not practical enough. Heinzerling and Tushnet are trying to be 
quite practical, aiming to provide with these materials what students need: 
"the skills-including the ability to read and understand statutes-associated 
with the modem regulatory state." 172 But they do not deliver the goods. 
In closing the book with a chapter on new governance mechanisms, 
Heinzerling and Tushnet ask a series of questions aimed at new governance's 
potential: "Can you identify the political conditions that make such uses 
possible? What are the political constraints on, and possibilities for, adopting 
reconstitutive regulation more broadly?"173 And after an excerpt on 
"reflexive environmental law," the authors ask whether such a system would 
"soften the system of adversariallegalism."174 They ask the right questions. 
I begin to address them below in Part IV. 
IV. Adversarial Legalism and Lawyers 
A. Accounting for Adversarial Legalism 
What will the American regulatory state look like in twenty years? To a 
certain extent, both books are making wagers on that answer. In this section, 
I argue that how each book deals with that question has an impact on the 
other and could help shape the very answer itself. The argument goes like 
this: a key and largely unexplored variable in the scalability of new 
governance in the United States is our culture of adversarial legalism, to use 
Robert Kagan's term. 175 In not grappling with that issue, the new governance 
literature currently falls short. 
But our adversariallegal culture is not fixed, and one explanatory factor 
here is how we train tomorrow's lawyers. Here, Heinzerling and Tushnet 
miss an opportunity. To be sure, they do not ask students to play the role of 
warrior litigators, but nor do they ask them to play the role of problem-
solving collaborators. 176 In failing to do so, they fail to maximize the 
172. HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 4, at x. 
173. !d. at 822. 
174. !d. at 804. 
175. KAGAN, supra note 9, at 3. 
176. See generally Susan P. Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Connecting 
Conversations About Women, the Academy, and the Legal Profession, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & 
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chances that tomorrow's lawyers will act to change the adversariallegal cul-
ture in which they operate. 
The political scientist Robert Kagan has had significant influence on the 
way we think about law in the United States with his research on adversarial 
legalism, which he views as a distinctively American phenomenon consisting 
of"policymaking, policy implementation, and dispute resolution by means of 
lawyer-dominated litigation."177 Kagan separates adversarial legalism into 
two principal components: "formal legal contestation" -that is, the frequent 
invocation of legal rights, duties, and procedural requirements in the course 
of policymaking and policy implementation-and "litigant activism"-a 
style of lawyering where the disputing parties dominate the assertion of 
claims and legal arguments, the gathering of evidence, and the selection of 
witnesses, unlike the model in Europe where the judge or administrative offi-
cial plays a larger role in shaping the proceeding.178 
Kagan's work relies heavily on cross-national studies that demonstrate 
that regulation in the United States is more adversarial and legalistic than that 
of other industrialized democracies, notably those of Europe and Japan. 179 
Though some scholars have questioned Kagan's normative assumptions (e.g., 
Is adversarial legalism necessarily bad?), 180 his basic descriptive point re-
mains largely unchallenged. For our purposes, then, Kagan's work raises a 
serious challenge to new governance scholarship, with its vision of collabo-
ration and inclusive participation. The question is: Why do new governance 
scholars think that interests accustomed to battling over policy will put down 
their swords, share information, and collaborate? 
Put differently, how can new governance schemes overcome the 
adversarial legal culture in the United States? Perhaps the reason why new 
governance is much more widespread in the European Union, and may re-
main that way, is because of this lack of adversarial legal culture. But this 
variable is largely unexplored in the new governance literature thus far. 
In his classic book on the topic, Adversarial Legalism: The American 
Way of Law, Kagan concludes by questioning whether the United States can 
move beyond adversarial legalism. 181 He posits that in order to do so, 
Americans need to be willing to accept giving administrative officials more 
discretion, and accord their decisions more finality, without the opportunity 
for legal challenge. 182 This is consistent with the European model, but Kagan 
POL 'Y 119 ( 1997) (discussing a paradigm shift from a "gladiator" model of lawyering to a 
"problem-solver" model of lawyering). 
177. /d. 
178. !d. at 9. 
179. !d. at 53. 
180. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, America the Adversarial, 89 VA. L. REV. 189 (2003) (reviewing 
KAGAN, supra note 9). 
181. KAGAN, supra note 9, at 242-52. 
182. /d. at 239-41; see also Freeman, supra note 10, at 96 (arguing that greater deference to 
agency discretion may be required at a minimum under the model of collaborative governance). 
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is skeptical that Americans will go for it. 183 Indeed, the experience in 
administrative law of the last few decades with "negotiated rulemaking," 
which might be described as new governance, offers weak support for the 
possibility of getting beyond adversarial legalism. As Cary Coglianese and 
other scholars have shown, the rules have been challenged nearly as much 
under negotiated rulemaking as with traditional rulemaking. 184 Strangely, the 
new governance scholars appear to ignore this literature. 
In order for new governance to succeed, perhaps it will be necessary to 
amend the Administrative Procedure Act to limit judicial review 
considerably .185 Will lawyers accept this? Regulated entities? Citizens? 
Should they?186 
Indeed, the adversarial legal culture may carry over to new governance 
schemes. To take one example, Kagan cites the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act187 as an example of a law that relies on due 
process rights and private lawsuits for enforcement, as opposed to an 
administrative-enforcement mechanism that would not rely on the courts. 188 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the same lawyers who challenged the 
schools on special-education issues have also started bringing legal chal-
lenges under NCLB. 189 Moreover, parents and their lawyers are starting to 
use the NCLB "right" to transfer students out of low-performing schools to 
challenge school rezoning decisions. 190 This is not to say that these develop-
ments are necessarily bad, just that the shift from a rights-based, court-centric 
model to a problem-solving, collaborative one seems tentative at best. 
183. KAGAN, supra note 9, at 242-43. 
184. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated 
Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1308, 1308-10 (1997) ("In the aggregate, negotiated rulemaking 
has not generated any substantial difference in the way that legal challenges get resolved."). 
185. Kagan appears to think so. See Robert A. Kagan, Political and Legal Obstacles to 
Collaborative Ecosystem Planning, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 871, 875, 874-75 (1997) (arguing that 
increasing use of collaborative ecosystem planning would be "aided immensely" by changes in 
statutes allowing parties to have access to the courts to challenge such plans); see also Frank B. 
Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of Administrative Rulemaking, 78 N.C. L. REV. 
1013, 1053 (2000) (arguing that negotiated rulemaking has been frustrated by the adversarial 
legalism that the APA's allowance for judicial review promotes). 
186. For an argument that they all should, see Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for 
Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1314-26 (1999), which argues that judicial 
review of administrative rulemaking allows interested parties to use litigation to change rules to 
their own benefit. 
187. Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 1401, 89 Stat. 773,775 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1400 (Supp. V 2005)). 
188. Robert A. Kagan, Do Lawyers Cause Adversarial Legalism?: A Preliminary Inquiry, 19 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY I, 18 (1994). 
189. See Interview with Beth F. Morris, Attorney, Harben & Hartley, in Gainesville, Ga. (Aug. 
31, 2007) (phone interview conducted by author). 
190. See Sam Dillon, Alabama School Rezoning Plan Brings Out Cry of Resegregation, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2007, at AI (describing the efforts of black Tuscaloosa parents to prevent students 
from being transferred to lower performing schools). 
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Alternatively, maybe it does not matter to the success of the new 
governance project if affected parties still have the opportunity to challenge 
regulations once formulated. But this would seem an odd conclusion since 
continued opportunity for challenge would reduce the incentive to actually 
participate and collaborate in the policymaking process. lf the claim, then, is 
that the collaborative process itself will lead to less adversarial positioning 
for strategic advantage, that requires some empirical support, particularly in 
light of the evidence to the contrary with respect to negotiated rulemaking. 191 
Lawyers will also need to be reassured that it is in their economic 
interest to support (or at least not oppose) new governance. That is, if 
lawyers for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, for example, cannot make 
money challenging agency regulations, they need to believe that they will be 
able to make as much money participating in shaping the regulations and re-
vising them in light of experience, or else lawyers' self-interest may help 
prop up the status quo. 
The scholars in Law and New Governance largely position themselves 
as social engineers-technocrats deciding the optimal government programs. 
But if the new governance scholars are going to succeed in understanding the 
circumstances in which such schemes will work, they must take greater ac-
count of how the schemes arise and are implemented. Specifically, they 
must account for the United States' culture of adversarial legalism, where 
interests represented by lawyers clash, and lawyers use and attempt to shape 
the law to serve their clients' interests. For better or worse, these lawyers are 
generally not trying to work with others to reach the "best" social outcome-
whether it be lower drug use, higher test scores in schools, or safer 
workplaces. Rather, they are trying to advance their clients' interests in 
particular contexts. 
The Regulatory and Administrative State generally takes the same 
technocratic perspective, that of a "disinterested social scientist, attempting 
to determine what choices among institutions would best serve the public 
interest." 192 Focusing on the general topic of risk regulation, the book asks 
the questions: When is government regulation necessary and desirable, and 
what form can and should regulation take? These are important and inter-
esting topics, but a lack of attention to adversarial legalism means that this 
book falls short. 
Tushnet and Heinzerling's failure to attend more closely to the role of 
lawyers and adversariallegalism is not just a pedagogical failure, then, it is a 
scholarly one as well. If the relative success of the regulatory instruments 
depends in part on the role that lawyers play and the degree to which adver-
sarial legalism can "gum up the works," so to speak, then comparative 
191. Tushnet speculates that the theory here is to "undermine the existing interest-group 
structure" and then "reconstitute it in a different form" that will be less obstruetionist to change and 
new forms of governance. Tushnet, supra note 65, at 391. 
192. HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 683. 
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institutional analysis that fails to look at these issues is incomplete and 
inaccurate. 
The example of NCLB helps illustrate this common weakness. With its 
accountability measures, the law was an example for the new governance 
scholars of the promise of democratic experimentalism (if properly 
implemented). 193 But only by examining how such a law has and could play 
out "on the ground" can one begin to understand the circumstances under 
which such a model of regulation can work and, where it fails, how it can be 
improved. And the way it will be implemented is not by everyone holding 
hands and working together for the public interest. It is through a complex 
pushing and pulling, with lawyers for teachers' unions, school districts, and 
government agencies battling over what constitutes compliance with the law. 
Only by examining this new governance innovation in the context of this ad-
versariallegal system can it be properly evaluated. 
Or return to the account of preemptive self-regulation on issues like data 
privacy and childhood obesity. Without a strategy whereby new governance 
encompasses such areas, it is difficult to see how it would become an over-
arching regulatory theory. Such areas are governed by a third kind of 
adversarial legalism that Anthony Sebok recently highlighted: institutional 
interests locked in permanent battle over the degree and kind of regulation in 
a particular domain. 194 He used it to describe the battle between the insur-
ance industry and doctors, on the one hand, and trial lawyers and Naderites, 
on the other, over the tort system. 195 But the same could apply to the 
teachers' unions, parents, and school districts in education policy, or other 
interests in any number of domains. 
In his contribution to Law and New Governance, Tushnet frames the 
issue nicely: "What are the political circumstances under which some 
innovations become significant in shaping large-scale policy?"196 He an-
swers the question by looking to the "large-scale structures of national 
governance," what he calls the "functional constitution."197 But as he has 
pointed out in other work, the political circumstances are not fixed: indeed, 
conservative constitutionalists had success by connecting with groups that 
had political interests in their success, such as business interests. 198 Only by 
identifying such interests, and working with them to build political support 
for experimentalist strategies, can new governance achieve a broader scale. 
193. Liebman and Sabel describe how NCLB "is informed by an innovative system of publicly 
monitored decentralization of school governance," known as the ''New Accountability," see 
Liebman & Sabel, supra note 69, at 1708, in which "ends are revised in light of means and vice 
versa," id. at 1713. 
194. See Anthony J. Sebok, Dispatches from the Tort Wars, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 1465 (2007) 
(book review). 
195. /d. at 1474-75, 1506. 
196. Tushnet, supra note 65, at 381. 
197. /d. 
198. Tushnct, supra note 58, at 360. 
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B. Training Lawyers 
If new governance is as transformative as its most ardent proponents 
think, de Billca and Scott posit, this will demand a "re-conceptualisation of 
our understanding of law and of the role of lawyers."199 Already, the new 
governance scholars have certainly made the case that such regulation is now 
part of the "modem regulator's toolkit."200 But the twenty-first-century regu-
latory state in Heinzerling and Tushnet still looks a lot like the twentieth-
century version in Hart and Sacks. 
Rather than introduce new governance methods at the end of the book in 
an "alternatives" section, Heinzerling and Tushnet in future editions might 
highlight such methods in Part III, when they talk about different regulatory 
instruments. Perhaps if lawyers are trained in new governance as a mode of 
regulation, they might be more inclined to propose such methods on behalf of 
clients or government agencies. 
Moreover, the causal arrow may run in both directions-that is, just as 
new governance may lead us to rethink the role of lawyers and therefore how 
we train them, a shift in how we train lawyers may help create an environ-
ment where new governance is more likely to succeed. 
Kagan provocatively asks in the title of one article: "Do Lawyers Cause 
Adversarial Legalism?"201 And he provides the tentative answer of 
(essentially): To a certain extent, yes.202 If that is the case and how we train 
lawyers is part of what leads to adversarial legalism, as Kagan argues, then 
we may need to rethink legal education if we want to increase new 
govemance.203 To be sure, changing the way we train lawyers is simply one 
piece of the puzzle, and perhaps a minor one relative to decentralized 
government, distrust of government power, and other factors. But it is a 
factor. 
The good news is that there are signs of change in legal education, 
consistent with the direction I describe here. Stanford, for example, is 
offering courses in the second and third year that have students work collabo-
199. De Burca & Seott, supra note 18, at 9; see also Dorf & Sabel, supra note 94, at 860-65 
(arguing that experimentalism may lead to a reconception of the very notion of what it means to be 
a professional such as a lawyer); Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 875, 928-29 (2003) (observing that Hart and Sacks's approach hinted at a new 
model of legal professionalism where lawyers' principal skill is the "ability to collaborate across 
disciplinary boundaries to solve problems"). 
200. HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 547. 
20 I. Kagan, supra note 188, tit. 
202. See id. at 2 ("[W}hile adversarial legalism stems primarily from enduring features of 
American political culture and governmental structure, the legal profession itself does play a 
significant independent role in promoting and perpetuating adversarial legal contestation as a 
prominent feature of governance."). 
203. See id. at 24-27; see also Sturm, supra note 176, at 128 ("Legal education plays a pivotal 
role in socializing lawyers to the primacy of the gladiator model [of lawyering}."). 
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ratively in interdisciplinary groups.204 Harvard's new Problems and Theories 
class also appears to be a step in this direction.205 Law firms are indicating 
they want graduates to have more problem-solving skills, and this may im-
pact law-school curricula.206 
The theme of the Association of American Law Schools' 2008 Annual 
Meeting was "Reassessing Our Roles as Scholars and Educators in Light of 
Change," and the description of the main plenary session, "Rethinking Legal 
Education for the 21st Century," begins: 
There is a growing sense among legal educators that it is time to re-
think legal education. Dissatisfaction with the Langdellian model, 
now over a century old, has combined with enthusiasm about new 
approaches to both content and pedagogy to produce a potential 
turning point in the way we educate our students. A number of law 
schools have announced major initiatives in the past few years, and 
others are planning to do so.207 
The bad news is there have been related calls for change of legal 
education before, with a limited degree of success. Institutional and 
individual inertia, resources, and other factors have played a role then as they 
do now in limiting change. 
What would such a change look like? As the former general counsel of 
General Electric recently put it, there ought be more emphasis in law school 
on "creating, rather than critiquing."208 Students might be asked to write a 
strategy memo for a multinational corporation seeking to do business in 
China but worried about how to deal with the risks of corruption, 209 or an 
options memo for a data broker or search engine facing parallel challenges to 
privacy concerns through litigation, state and federal regulatory bodies, and 
on the public-relations front. 210 Should the company implement an internal 
system of self-regulation, an industry-wide one, or neither? Or should the 
company press for federal standards and try to preempt state law?211 
204. See Baldas, supra note 6, at S I; Press Release, Stanford Law Sch., A "3D" JD: Stanford 
Law School Announces New Model for Legal Education (Nov. 28, 2006), available at 
http://www.law.stanford.edu/news/pr/47/ (describing such simulation courses as part of the 
eurricular-reform effort). 
205. See infra note 216. 
206. See Baldas, supra note 6, at S5 (recounting responses to Northwestern University School 
of Law focus groups asking managing partners what competencies students need to be successful 
lawyers: project-manager and leadership skills, teamwork skills, and understanding legal strategy). 
207. Association of American Law Schools, Reassessing Our Roles as Scholars and Educators 
in Light of Change, http://www.aals.org/am2008/friday/index.htrnl#plenary. 
208. Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Law and Leadership, 56 J. LEGAL Eouc. 596, 608 (2007). 
209. Heineman describes this as one of his challenges at General Electric. See id. 
210. See Ludington, supra note 97, at 154-58, 173 (describing three private-sector security 
breaches and the ensuing state and federal legislative responses, and proposing a new tort for misuse 
of personal information in order to protect privacy interests). 
211. This appears to be the strategy of several industries today. See Eric Lipton & Gardiner 
Harris, In Turnaround, Industries Seek U.S. Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2007, at AI. 
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Some of the new governance scholars have explored the meaning of 
"lawyering for a new democracy" in the context of public-interest 
lawyering,212 but it need not be confined to that context. Besides the 
examples above, one can think of countless others. For example, from my 
own experience working at a major research university, I recall lawyers 
working with scientists and administrators to come up with a system for ap-
proving and monitoring stem-cell research experiments, and ensuring that 
federal-government money was not used for such research.213 Students could 
be asked to work in teams to come up with creative solutions to similar 
problems. After all, lawyers and their clients are not mere passive recipients 
of regulatory output from government; they help shape regulatory regimes in 
fundamental ways. 
In future editions, Heinzerling and Tushnet can do more along these 
lines. So when the authors discuss cost-benefit analysis in Chapter 9, they 
might include a scenario where students represent a company or trade asso-
ciation preparing to submit materials to an agency undertaking cost-benefit 
analysis of a particular regulation. And students could be asked how exactly 
they would make the case. 
Similarly, in discussing the ways that regulation can fail in the same 
chapter, students as lawyers representing clients might be asked how strongly 
they would oppose or push for a particular regulation. If they are represent-
ing a regulated entity, for example, but the enforcement mechanism is weak 
or not likely to work, perhaps they ought to spend their political capital 
elsewhere. On the flip side, students might think about whether there are 
scenarios where requesting more regulation might benefit their clients, as 
Mattei is currently doing in asking for more regulation of imported toys, or 
as Google is in asking for privacy standards so that they do not have to do 
more than their competitors.214 
Such an approach would approximate more the "case method" in 
business schools, placing students in real-world situations and asking them to 
think through options for dealing with the situation at hand.215 lt would not 
212. See Symposium, Lawyering for a New Democracy, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 271; see also 
Sturm, supra note 176, at 129 ("[The] image and practice of lawyer as gladiator is not descriptive of 
the range of roles that many lawyers play or of how many lawyers work .... "). 
213. See Alvin Powell, Vigilant Eyes Oversee Stem Cell Research, HARV. U. GAZETIE, Apr. 
22, 2004, at S7, S7, available at http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2004/04.22/99-Stem 
Ethics.html (describing the board of scientists and ethicists that oversaw Harvard's efforts). 
214. See, e.g., Lipton & Harris, supra note 211, at A 13 ("American toymakers recently asked 
the federal government to allow the Consumer Product Safety Commission to require premarket 
safety testing of all toys."); Coogle Lobbies for Privacy Standards, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 15, 
2007, at C2 (reporting that Google has urged countries to adopt a set of uniform privacy rules). 
215. See Heineman, supra note 208, at 608 (arguing that law schools should develop "complex, 
interdisciplinary case studies" like those in business and public policy schools "to illuminate the 
multiple dimensions of issues and processes"); Rakoff & Minow, supra note 169, 603-05 
(comparing the use of case studies at business schools and law schools); Robert J. Rhee, Follow the 
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involve reading cases in the sense of appellate opinions except as background 
for understanding the legal landscape; walking through those "cases" would 
not be a focus in class as it is in most law-school classes.216 
V. Conclusion 
The fate of the project at the heart of each book is inextricably linked to 
the other. For the new governance scholars, the success of new governance 
as an overarching regulatory theory depends, at least in the United States, on 
the next generation of lawyers having the skills and inclination to overcome 
the culture of adversarial legalism that pervades policy implementation 
today. That is, in determining the success of new governance as a model for 
the twenty-first-century regulatory state, the training and receptivity of law-
yers may well be an explanatory variable. 
By the same token, for public law curricular reformers like Tushnet and 
Heinzerling, their book only succeeds if it provides adequate tools to the next 
generation of lawyers to be effective in the twenty-first-century regulatory 
state. To be sure, there is an as yet unanswerable question here: What will 
the U.S. regulatory state look like in twenty years? But I suspect that the 
new governance scholars may be more right about the future than Tushnet 
thinks and that the materials and skills in The Regulatory and Administrative 
State are therefore inadequate preparation for the twenty-first-century regu-
latory state. 
The students who are trained by The Regulatory and Administrative 
State will understand what it means to challenge agency-issued regulations in 
the courts under the APA,217 but not how to work with a school district to 
develop a plan to meet the goals of the NCLB law218 or a hospital developing 
a system to protect information privacy under the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). 219 Yet the latter tasks are likely 
to be more common than APA challenges for lawyers in 2020, and probably 
even today. 
M.B.A. Model, NAT'L L.J., May 28, 2007, at 22, 22 (arguing that law schools should incorporate the 
business-school case method into the "structural fabric of the curriculum"). 
216. In their curricular reform, Harvard separated the idea of putting lawyers in "role" and 
asking them to work as problem solvers by creating a separate course, given in between the regular 
semesters, called Problems and Theories. HLS Curricular Reform, supra note 5. This may well 
have been the result of a compromise among Harvard's faculty, see Rakoff & Minow, supra note 
169, at 604 (indicating such exercises should "become prominent features of our required first-year 
curriculum"), but pedagogically the same approach ought to be used in regulatory-state courses. 
217. See HEINZERLING & TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 416--17 (excerpting Richard Stewart, The 
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975), which details the 
theoretical underpinnings of the role of agencies in the APA). 
218. See Simon, supra note 39, at 56-57 (discussing implementation of the No Child Left 
Behind Act). 
219. See Trubek, supra note 30, at 252-55 (discussing the development and potential revision 
ofHIPAA). 
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At the same time, the new governance scholars could benefit from the 
kind of comparative institutional analysis that Heinzerling and Tushnet teach 
their students. For example, is the NCLB method of allowing states the 
flexibility to define standards for students really likely to lead to higher stu-
dent achievement than if the federal government set the standards itself? If 
so, why? This kind of comparative analysis is frequently absent from the 
inevitability narrative advanced by some of the new governance scholars. 
As we move more or less toward a new constitutional order in the 
United States, we must understand the kinds of regulatory mechanisms that 
are likely to be effective and train tomorrow's lawyers to represent their cli-
ents effectively within such a regulatory framework. Together, these two 
books are a promising start. 
